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reaching a feeble 1.5% rate in 2016 and 1.8% in 2021, the final year of 
the scenario. For the whole period of 2012-2021, GDP growth averaged 
only about 1.3% (see the shaded area in Figure 1, next page).
What about employment? Not surprisingly, it dropped significantly. 
The ratio of the employed to the working-age population declined 
progressively from an already low level of 65.7% in 2012, in the wake of 
the Great Recession, to 63.2% in 2021.
The proposed budget cutting did succeed in reducing the relative 
importance of government expenditures. The ratio of such expenditures 
to GDP declined from 20.3% in 2012 to 16.7% in 2021. 
What about the other major sources of aggregate demand? The ratio of 
consumption to GDP declined slightly, from 74% to 73%. However, the 
ratio of private investment to GDP rose from about 10% in 2012 to 13% 
in 2021 (Figure 2, next page).
But price inflation barely stayed above zero (i.e., deflation) from 2016 
onwards. The current account deteriorated as the real exchange rate
appreciated by about 13% between 2012 and 2021. Hence, it is not 
surprising that, as a ratio to GDP, the current account still registered 
a deficit of -2.2% in 2021. It is also not surprising that GDP growth 
remained so lacklustre through 2021 since most of the core components 
of aggregated demand declined.
But what about the government deficit and the total debt stock, the 
explicit targets of expenditure reductions? Net government lending as 
a ratio to GDP did indeed drop drastically, from -7.8% in 2012 to a mere 
-0.5% in 2021. And the ratio of total debt to GDP was correspondingly 
reduced, from 85% in 2012 to 63% in 2021.
So, the budget-slashing strategy was successful on its own terms—
namely, reducing the Government’s annual deficits and its debt stock. 
But these targets were achieved at the expense of deterioration in 
aggregate demand, economic growth and employment.
The Fiscal-Stimulus Scenario
Is there a viable alternative strategy to drastic slashing of government 
expenditures that could achieve both a reduction in US government 
debt and an increase in employment-creating economic growth? This 
objective guides the logic of our alternative ‘fiscal-stimulus’ scenario, 
which seeks to expand government expenditures instead of cutting 
them.
This alternative scenario contains a few key assumptions. Our central 
assumption is that there is a growth rate of government expenditures of 
5% per year. We also assume that increases in government expenditures 
have a positive, though moderate, impact on private investment. 
Thus, the underlying assumption is that the character of government 
expenditures is designed precisely in order to boost private investment.
In addition, we assume a targeted increase to 21% in the ratio of net 
government income to GDP. This target is comparable to the average
Late July 31st 2011, President Obama and leaders of both 
political parties in the US Congress finally agreed on a framework 
that would increase the Government’s ceiling on its debt and institute 
significant budget cuts over the next 10 years.
 
About $917 billion in deficit reduction over 10 years was agreed in 
July with an initial modest cut of only $12 billion proposed for 2012. In 
addition, a Special Joint Committee of Congress was set up to hammer 
out agreement on further cuts of up to $1.5 trillion (or compensating 
revenue increases). 
Should this Committee be unable to reach agreement on a package 
of cuts in expenditures and increases in taxes, the further cuts of $1.5 
trillion would automatically be implemented. Half of the cuts would be 
on the budgets for national security and defense. Medicare would also 
be subject to some expenditure reductions.
So, the worst-case scenario over ten years, starting in 2012, could be a 
total of about $2.4 trillion in budget cuts. What could be the economic 
consequences of such a scenario? And what could be an alternative 
approach?
In order to answer these questions, we employed the State of the World 
Economy global macroeconomic model in order to construct a plausible 
scenario through 2021. See www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/expertise/worldmodel 
for further details on the model, which is designed primarily to 
construct medium-term policy-oriented global scenarios. To function 
effectively, the model is calibrated to simulate historical trends from 
1970 to 2009. It is not a general equilibrium model.
The Budget-Slashing Scenario
For what we call our ‘budget-slashing’ scenario, we arbitrarily assigned 
the same large magnitude of cuts each year over the nine years 
after 2012. The resultant total, including the modest cut for 2012, 
approximated the agreed target of $2.4 trillion.
We also assumed that some of the cuts in the budget would take the 
form of asset transactions, such as selling off government assets, or 
gains in net government income because of reductions in transfers.
In order to set this scenario within a realistic global framework, we also 
assumed fiscal tightening in other developed countries, starting with 
Europe. We programmed the model to reduce the ratio of government 
debt to GDP to a realistic specific target for each bloc or country. For 
example, the debt-to-GDP ratio was programmed to drop to 50% for 
both Central and Northern Europe, to 70% for the United Kingdom, to 
80% for Southern Europe, and to 120% for Japan.
For this Development Viewpoint, we focus on the results for the US 
economy, not those for the other blocs and countries.
When our assumptions were fed into the model, the result was an 
immediate sharp recession in the US in 2013, with GDP growth 
dropping to a negative 3.4%. Thereafter, growth recovered meekly, 
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levels of government income in other developed economies. The reason 
for this assumption is that low revenue levels have been a major cause 
of rising US government deficits.
This income assumption represents a decisive break with recent US 
history, in which government income as a ratio to GDP was allowed to 
languish at a low level of about 15%. For instance, movement towards 
our target would benefit immediately from letting the lavish pro-rich 
Bush-era tax cuts expire.
In order to prevent deterioration in the current account, we also assume 
that the nominal exchange rate of the US dollar is adjusted to hold the 
real exchange rate relatively constant. Note that the policies in other 
developed countries are the same as in the first scenario.
How do the results produced by the ‘fiscal-stimulus’ scenario compare to 
the results produced by the ‘budget-slashing’ scenario?
After dipping slightly from 3% in 2012 to 2.4% in 2013, the growth rate 
of GDP progressively increases thereafter, reaching 4.1% in 2021. For the 
whole period of 2012-2021, growth averaged 3.4% (in contrast to 1.3% 
for the ‘budget-slashing’ scenario).
Employment improved markedly in this scenario. The ratio of the 
employed to the working-age population increased from 65.7% in 
2012 to virtually 69% in 2021. Note, however, that the 2021 level 
only reinstated the level of employment achieved before the Great 
Recession.
Increases in employment were also driven by rising private investment. 
The ratio of such investment to GDP reached 15% in 2021, above the 
level of 13% attained in the ‘budget-slashing’ scenario.
As domestic aggregate demand increased, driven mostly by 
government expenditures and private investment, the current account 
moderately deteriorated. Its deficit as a ratio to GDP increased from -2% 
in 2012 to about -3% in 2021 though the latter level remained much 
below pre-crisis levels of about -5%.
Holding the real exchange rate relatively constant helped to prevent the 
current-account deficit from becoming a significant drag on demand. 
Since price inflation only exceeded 2% by 2021, the adjustment of the 
nominal exchange rate did not need to be drastic.
In contrast to the downward trend for ‘budget-slashing’, government 
expenditures as a ratio to GDP increased significantly in this scenario, 
reaching 23.5% in 2021, up from a level of 20.3% in 2012. However, the 
ratio of net government income to GDP also increased, reaching the 
target of 21% in 2021. 
Hence, net government lending as a ratio to GDP was reduced from 
-7.8% in 2012 to -2.5% in 2021. This is a credible performance—though 
not as drastic as the result in the ‘budget-slashing’ scenario. 
A major result for the ‘fiscal-stimulus’ scenario is that it achieved a 
level of debt-to-GDP that was similar to the level attained by ‘budget-
slashing’. For the former the ratio dropped to 65% in 2021 while for the 
latter the ratio declined to 63% (Figure 3).
Overall, the outcomes achieved by the ‘fiscal-stimulus’ scenario appear 
superior. This is certainly the case for performances on growth, private 
investment and employment. Also, the level of government debt (a 
principal objective of budget negotiations in the US) is similar in both 
scenarios. 
Though yearly net government lending is more negative in the ‘fiscal-
stimulus’ scenario, the levels of both government expenditures and 
income are more comparable to those for other developed economies. 
Figure 3: Government Debt as %  of GDP  1990-2021, United States
Figure 1: Growth Rate of GDP 1990-2021, United States
Figure 2: Employment Rate  1990-2021, United States
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